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Uncovering the Silent Victims of the
American Medical Liability System
JoannaShepherd*
A frequently overlooked problem with the current medical liability
system is the vast number of medical errors that go uncompensated.Although
studies indicate that 1% of hospitalpatients are victims of medical negligence,
fewer than 2% of these injured patients file claims. In this Article, I explain
that many victims of medical malpracticedo not file claims because they are
unable to find attorneys willing to take their cases.
I conducted the first national survey of attorneys to explore medical
malpractice victims' access to the civil justice system. The results from the
survey indicate that the economic reality of litigationforces many contingent
fee attorneys to reject legitimate cases. In fact, over 75% of the attorneys in my
survey indicate that they reject more than 90% of the cases that they screen.
The attorneys explain that insufficient damages and high litigation expenses
are theirprimary reasons for rejecting cases and that several tort reforms have
reduced their willingness to accept cases. Moreover, the majority of the
attorneys report that they have threshold damage values below which they will
not even consider accepting a case. Indeed, over half of the attorneys
responded that they will not accept a case unless expected damages are at least
$250,000-even for a case they are almost certain to win on the merits. For a
case in which winning is less certain, most attorneys require minimum
expected damages of $500,000 to accept the case. Because of the high cost of
medical malpractice litigation, contingent fee attorneys simply cannot
economicallyjustify taking cases with damages below these thresholds.
To understand the extent of this access-to-justice problem, I use
private-industry claims data to show that 95% of medical malpractice victims
will find it extremely difficult to find legal representation unless their
damages are significantly larger than the typical damages for their types of
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injuries. Thus, the medical liability system silences many legitimate victims of
medical malpractice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The public narrative of the American medical liability system
suggests a system in crisis: frivolous lawsuits deter doctors from
performing valuable procedures, the threat of liability deters doctors
from practicing in certain regions, and pervasive defensive medicine
amplifies the overall cost of the healthcare system.' However, a
routinely ignored detail is the large number of silent victims in the
system-victims of medical negligence who never receive
compensation for their injuries. According to the National Academy of
Science's Institute of Medicine, medical errors are the leading cause of
accidental death in the United States, taking the lives of "[a]t least
44,000 people, and perhaps as many as 98,000 people" each year. 2
Studies on the number of injuries from medical negligence indicate
that 1% of all hospital patients suffer adverse events due to medical
error. 3 Yet despite this high rate of medical negligence, fewer than 2%
of the injured patients file claims. 4
In this Article, I explain that many legitimate victims of
medical malpractice do not file claims because they are unable to find
attorneys willing to take their cases. Exorbitant litigation expenses
and recovery-limiting reforms have made contingent fee lawyers
increasingly unwilling, and unable, to accept many legitimate medical
malpractice claims.5 These attorneys simply cannot economically
justify taking the cases because their expected recoveries will not
offset the likely costs of litigating the claims. As a result, many
legitimate victims of medical malpractice-victims who suffer real
harm as a result of true medical negligence-are left with no legal
representation and no way to seek redress in the civil justice system.
I conducted the first national survey of medical malpractice
attorneys that explores the problem of silent victims in the medical
liability system. The results from the survey indicate that the
1.
For a discussion of the empirical evidence on the effect of liability on physician behavior,
see Joanna Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLAL. REV. 905, 924-29 (2008).
2.
INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (1999), available
at http://www.iom.edulReports/1999/to-err-is-human-building-a-safer-health-system.aspx.
3.
A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between MalpracticeClaims and Adverse Events Due
to Negligence: Results of the Harvard MedicalPractice Study III, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 246
(1991).
Id. at 247.
4.
5.
This Article explores one negative consequence of tort reform: the inability of many
legitimate victims to find legal representation. There are numerous other arguments both in
favor of and against tort reform that are beyond the scope of this Article. For a review of these
arguments, see Shepherd, supra note 1, at 905-21, 960-71.
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economic reality of litigation forces many attorneys to reject legitimate
cases. In fact, over 75% of the attorneys in my survey indicate that
they reject more than 90% of the cases that they screen. The attorneys
explain that insufficient damages and high litigation expenses are
their primary reasons for rejecting cases and that several tort reforms
have reduced their willingness to accept cases. Moreover, the majority
of the attorneys report that they have threshold damage values below
which they will not consider accepting a case. In fact, over half of the
attorneys responded that they will not accept a case unless expected
damages are at least $250,000, even for a case they are almost certain
to win on the merits. For a case in which winning is less certain, most
attorneys require minimum expected damages of $500,000 to accept a
case. Because of the high cost of medical malpractice litigation,
plaintiffs' attorneys simply cannot economically justify taking cases
with damages below these thresholds.
Thus, my survey provides evidence confirming that many
legitimate victims of medical malpractice have no meaningful access
to the civil justice system. Moreover, using a private-industry claims
dataset, I show that 95% of medical malpractice victims have extreme
difficulty finding legal representation unless their damages are
significantly larger than the typical damages for their types of
injuries. Data also suggest that the problem of access to justice is
worsening; half as many victims with low damage awards recovered in
2010 as they did twenty-five years earlier. The economic realities of
the medical liability system are silencing a growing number of victims.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the principal
objectives of the medical liability system: to compensate patients that
are injured by the negligence of medical providers and to deter those
medical providers from practicing negligently. I discuss numerous
empirical studies suggesting that the medical liability system
performs poorly on both of these dimensions. The majority of victims
never file a claim at all, and the victims that do file claims often
receive inadequate compensation that does not reimburse all of the
malpractice-related costs. Moreover, delays in litigation and
increasing litigation expenses further reduce the compensation to
malpractice victims. Empirical evidence suggests that the lack of
victim compensation has, in turn, reduced the liability system's
deterrent effect by blunting incentives for the medical community to
improve care; most studies find that malpractice liability does not
influence physician behavior.
Part III discusses the history of tort victims' access to the civil
justice system. Early American tort victims had limited access to legal
representation because they were forced to pay attorneys' fees
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regardless of whether they won or lost a case, and few had the
financial resources to do so. Contingent fee arrangements evolved to
ensure that all tort victims, regardless of their financial position, had
access to legal representation in the civil justice system.
Yet, in the modern medical liability system, two factors have
made contingent fee lawyers increasingly unwilling and unable to
accept many legitimate claims. High litigation costs and damagerestricting tort reforms have made it economically infeasible for
attorneys to take many medical malpractice cases. Plaintiffs'
attorneys simply cannot justify taking cases that lack sufficient
damages to warrant the litigation expense. As a result, most
unrepresented victims receive no compensation for their harms.
Moreover, the economic calculus required by the contingent fee system
causes attorneys to gravitate towards some types of medical
malpractice cases and victims while ignoring others. Evidence shows
that contingent fee attorneys disproportionately reject cases from
lower-income groups such as females, the elderly, children, and racial
minorities because their expected damage awards are lower.
In Part IV, I discuss my national survey of medical malpractice
plaintiffs' attorneys. The survey first asks a variety of questions to
establish that the attorneys and their firms are representative of the
larger population of medical malpractice attorneys. The survey
inquires about the attorneys' experiences screening and rejecting
cases and their primary reasons for rejecting the cases that they do. It
asks various questions about the minimum amount of expected
damages the attorneys require to accept cases with different
likelihoods of winning on the merits. It inquires about the impact of
various tort reforms on attorneys' willingness to accept cases. It also
explores their typical legal expenses, clients' recoveries, and attorneys'
fees in cases that close in settlements, trials, and dismissals.
The results from my survey indicate that many attorneys are
unwilling to represent legitimate victims of medical malpractice if the
attorneys do not expect a sufficiently large recovery. The attorneys
reject the vast majority of cases and list economic factors as their
main reason for rejecting cases. They indicate that tort reforms
capping plaintiff recoveries have increased their rejections of potential
clients. Accordingly, the majority of the attorneys indicate that they
will not accept any case, even a near-certain victory, if expected
damages are less than $250,000.
Part V explores which medical malpractice victims are most
likely to be silent and how the access-to-justice problem has changed
over time. Using a private-industry dataset of claims and payments in
the medical liability system from 1985 to 2010, I show that only the
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most severely injured victims will be able to easily find legal
representation. In fact, my survey results imply that 95% of medical
malpractice victims find it extremely difficult to find legal
representation unless their damages are significantly higher than the
typical damages for their types of injuries. The data also reveal a
worsening access-to-justice problem. Over the past twenty-five years,
the number of victims recovering low damage awards has declined by
half. Without legal representation, the medical liability system
compensates fewer and fewer of these victims for their harms.
Thus, this Article establishes that the medical liability system
has many silent victims-the many legitimate victims of medical
malpractice who are unable to obtain legal representation and thereby
have no meaningful access to the civil justice system. Without legal
representation, most of these victims are not compensated for the
injuries they suffer as a result of medical negligence. In turn, the
medical liability system fails to provide adequate precautionary
incentives for healthcare providers. Without dramatic change, the
access-to-justice problem will continue to hinder the system's ability to
achieve its compensatory and deterrent functions.
II. THE AMERICAN MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM: THEORY AND PRACTICE

In this Part, I first briefly describe the primary functions of the
medical liability system: deterrence and compensation. I then review
existing empirical research on whether the current system achieves
these functions.
A. Functions of the Medical Liability System
Tort scholars have long focused on two main functions of the
tort system: compensation and deterrence.6 The compensatory
function aims to reimburse victims for their losses from tortious acts
and to restore them to their preinjury condition. 7 As a subset of tort
6.
John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521 (2003). For a
discussion of other proposed functions of tort law, such as enterprise liability and social justice,

see Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law,
57 SMU L. REV. 163, 180-201 (2004).
7.
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (2000):
Compensation of injured persons is one of the generally accepted aims of tort law.
Payment of compensation to injured persons is desirable. If a person has been
wronged by a defendant, it is just that the defendant make compensation.
Compensation is also socially desirable, for otherwise the uncompensated injured
persons will represent further costs and problems for society.
Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 45
(1994) ("The commonly understood goal of tort compensation is to restore the injured to their
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law, a primary goal of the medical liability system is to compensate
victims of medical negligence for any harm they suffer as a result of
that negligence. For example, the system aims to compel the surgeon
who botches an operation to reimburse the victim for any additional
medical bills, lost income resulting from time away from work, and
pain and suffering that resulted from the surgeon's mistakes.
Tort law seeks to achieve its second main function, deterrence,
by incentivizing individuals to take precautions and avoid risky
behavior.8 Similarly, the medical liability system aims to incentivize
medical providers to take precautions to reduce unnecessary risks
associated with medical care.
If changes in the liability system increase potential liability,
and subsequently the costs of engaging in dangerous activities, some
potential tortfeasors may cease completely engaging in the activities,
or they may reduce the number of high-risk procedures they perform.9
For example, in response to increased liability, some OB-GYNs may
reduce their number of high-risk deliveries, switch to a straight
gynecology practice, or even leave the state.
Even if the increase in potential liability does not cause the
potential tortfeasor to reduce or even cease the activity, she may
respond by taking more precautions to reduce risks.10 For example,
she may more conscientiously keep current with the latest treatments
or order more diagnostic tests.
Compensatory damages, as distinct from punitive damages,
provide the crucial link between the compensatory and deterrent
functions of tort law." Although these damages are called
"compensatory," they work to achieve both goals. First, as the name
implies, compensatory damages compensate the victim for his injuries
preaccident condition, to make them whole."); Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis":A
Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 769 (1987)

("[Ilnjured plaintiffs should receive an amount necessary to make them 'whole,' that is, to restore
them to the position they would have occupied but for the defendant's tortious conduct.").
8. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 206 (2d ed.
2002); PETER CANE, ATIYAH's ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 361 (Cambridge

University Press 6th ed. 2004) (arguing that deterrence is "[olne of the most important of the
suggested functions of personal injuries compensation law"); Richard L. Abel, A Critiqueof Torts,
37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 808 (1990) ("At least since Learned Hand offered his famous
formula ... judges, lawyers, and legal scholars have argued that fear of liability will compel
potential tortfeasors to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, taking just those safety precautions
that cost less than the accidents they prevent."); Shuman, supra note 7, at 41-42 (discussing
awarding compensation to the plaintiff when the defendant's conduct needs to be deterred).
9. Economists call such responses to increased liability "activity-level" responses. See, e.g.,
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw & ECONOMICS 323-28 (2004).

10.
11.

Economists' term for this is a "care-level" response. Id. at 368.
See id. at 320-23.
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in an attempt to return him to his preinjury condition. Second,
requiring the tortfeasor to compensate the victim forces her to
internalize the costs of her risky behavior and deters her from
engaging in inappropriately risky activities. The higher the expected
compensatory damages he expects to pay, the greater the cost of
engaging in the risky activity, and the more he will be deterred from
engaging in the activity without proper precautions. 12 Similarly, the
possibility of compensatory damages in medical malpractice cases
gives medical providers a financial incentive to internalize the harm
they impose on patients and to reduce the risks associated with
medical care.
B. Empirical Evidence on the Functioningof the Medical Liability
System
In theory, medical malpractice law should both provide
compensation to injured patients and induce doctors and hospitals to
take appropriate precautions against adverse medical events. In
practice, however, the medical liability system performs poorly on both
of these objectives. In this Section, I first present the existing evidence
regarding how effectively the system compensates the victims of
medical malpractice. Then, I discuss empirical studies that examine
the medical liability system's ability to deter adverse medical events.
1. How Well Does the Medical Liability System Compensate Victims?
Many medical malpractice victims never receive compensation
for their harm. The majority of victims never file a claim at all, and
the victims that do file claims often receive inadequate compensation
that does not fully reimburse their malpractice-related harms.
Moreover, delays in litigation and increasing litigation expenses
further reduce the compensation to malpractice victims.
Empirical evidence confirms that the vast majority of patients
injured by medical error do not seek redress in the civil justice system.
In 1991, the landmark Harvard Medical Practice Study analyzed the
medical records and legal claims (when filed) of a random sample of

12. For evidence of the tort system's deterrent effect, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 390-422
(1994); see also FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., DRINKERS, DRIVERS, AND BARTENDERS: BALANCING

PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 18-20 (2000) (studying bartender liability for

serving excessive liquor to patrons). Many other scholars doubt the effectiveness of the deterrent
effect of tort liability. For a discussion, see King, supra note 6, at 188-92.
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31,429 hospital patients in New York State.13 The researchers
determined that 1% of all hospital patients suffer adverse events due
to medical negligence. 14 Yet despite this high rate of medical
negligence, the researchers found that fewer than 2% of the injured
patients file claims.15 More recent research largely mirrors these
findings. A review of 14,700 medical records in Colorado and Utah also
shows that 1%of hospital patients suffer adverse events that are the
result of negligent acts or omissions in the care rendered.16 Of these
victims, the data show that only 2.5% file a legal claim.' 7 In Part III, I
explain how victims' inability to find legal representation contributes
to the low claim rate among legitimate victims of medical malpractice.
Moreover, the small proportion of malpractice victims that do
file claims often go undercompensated. Empirical studies of
malpractice lawsuits find that even for plaintiffs whom outside
experts have determined to be legitimate victims of medical
negligence-that is, in cases in which liability should be clear-the
compensation rate only ranges from 32% to 89%.18 Thus, even for the
few malpractice victims who file claims, most claims go
undercompensated.
Additionally, increasing litigation delays and legal fees
undermine the malpractice system's compensatory function. Medical
malpractice awards are subject to lengthy delays, which effectively
reduce compensation as inflationary pressures reduce the value of
damage awards. Research shows that, on average, resolving a
malpractice claim takes approximately four years.' 9 Moreover,
because of rising legal fees, tort victims generally retain only a portion
of compensatory damage awards. Empirical studies show that for
every dollar defendants and insurers pay to compensate medical
malpractice victims, between forty and sixty cents covers litigation

13. Localio et al., supra note 3, at 245.
14. Id. at 246.
15. Id. at 247.
16. David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah
and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 251, 253 (2000).

17. Id. at 255.
18. Theodore Eisenberg, The EmpiricalEffects of Tort Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer Arlen ed., forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 12), availableat
http://ssrn.comlabstract=2032740.
19. THOMAS H. COHEN & KRISTEN A. HUGHES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000-2004, at 9 (2007), available at
http://www.bjs.govicontent/pub/pdflmmicss04.pdf.
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expenses and other transaction costs. 2 0 As a result, victims keep only
40% to 60% of their damage awards.
Thus, the existing empirical literature confirms that
underclaiming, undercompensation, delay, and rising litigation costs
all plague the current medical liability system. In Part III, I explore
how the access-to-justice problem contributes to the malpractice
system's failure to achieve its compensatory goals.
2. How Well Does the Medical Liability System Deter Adverse Events?
Although the evidence indicates that only a small portion of
malpractice victims seek redress in the civil justice system, and
although an even smaller portion are adequately compensated for
their harms, tort liability remains a principal vehicle for holding
healthcare providers accountable for medical errors. However,
empirical evidence suggests that the lack of victim compensation has,
in turn, blunted incentives for the medical community to improve
care. 21 Indeed, a significant body of empirical research examining the
relationship between malpractice risk and health outcomes has
generated only mixed results, with most studies finding that liability
risk has no influence on physician behavior.
Because OB-GYNs are defendants in medical malpractice
lawsuits at a higher rate than any other specialty, 22 the majority of
empirical work has examined how they respond to litigation risk.
Several studies have explored the relationship between an OB-GYN's
cesarean rate and his claims history or malpractice risk to determine
whether physicians prefer less-risky procedures (cesareans over
natural labor) when malpractice pressure is greater. The results are
20.

PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY

187 (1985) (finding that for each dollar received by plaintiff, approximately sixty-six cents is
spent by the parties on litigation, implying that plaintiffs' share of total expenditures is
$1.00/$1.66 = 0.60); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 151 (1990) (claiming that sixty cents of every dollar spent on malpractice
liability insurance are absorbed by administrative and legal costs, implying that only forty cents
would be left for victims); David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors,and Compensation Payments
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024 (2006) (claiming that for
every dollar spent on compensation, fifty-four cents went to litigation expenses and other
transaction costs).
21. Another explanation for the weak deterrent effect of the liability system is the distortion
created by medical malpractice insurance. Medical providers with insurance typically do not pay
the victims' damages. Moreover, the malpractice insurance is typically not strongly experience
rated, so the premiums do not adjust to reflect the liability risk of a particular provider. Instead,
the premiums typically reflect more general factors such as location and medical specialty. Frank
A. Sloan, Experience Rating: Does It Make Sense for Medical Malpractice Insurance?, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 128, 128-29 (1990).
22. Studdert et al., supra note 20, at 2026.
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mixed. Some studies have found a positive correlation between
cesarean rates and litigation risk, 23 but several others have failed to
find a relationship. 24 Another study found a small, short-lived increase
in cesarean-section rates following litigation, but rates eventually
returned to the baseline level. 25 Thus, despite some evidence of a
positive relationship, the studies do not generally support a consistent
association between liability pressure and cesarean-section rates. As a
result, it is not clear that malpractice pressure has any influence on
the behavior of OB-GYNs.
Other studies have examined the relationship between an OBGYN's malpractice risk and actual health outcomes. Again, the results
are mixed. One study found no relationship between malpractice risk
and adverse birth outcomes. 26 However, other studies have found that
higher malpractice risk is associated with fewer preventable
complications in labor and delivery27 and a reduction in fetal deaths. 28
A few empirical studies have explored the influence of
malpractice risk on health outcomes beyond obstetrics patients. Two
widely cited studies find that tort reforms to reduce malpractice risk
are not associated with any change in the health outcomes of elderly
heart patients. 29 Thus, in contrast to what theory would predict,
23. See Lisa Dubay et al., The Impact of MalpracticeFears on Cesarean Section Rates, 18 J.
HEALTH ECON. 491, 509 (1999); Darren Grant & Melayne Morgan McInnes, Malpractice

Experience and the Incidence of Cesarean Delivery: A Physician-Level LongitudinalAnalysis, 41
INQUIRY 170, 170-88 (2004); A. Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between Malpractice Claims
and Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366, 366 (1993); Stephen M. Rock, MalpracticePremiums and

Primary Cesarean Section Rates in New York and Illinois, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 459, 459-60
(1988); A. Dale Tussing & Martha A. Wojtowycz, Malpractice, Defensive Medicine, and Obstetric
Behavior, 35 MED. CARE 172, 185 (1997).
24. See Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics, 274 JAMA 1606,

1606-10 (1995); Gilbert W. Gimm, The Impact of Malpractice Liability Claims on Obstetrical
Practice Patterns, 45 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 195, 195-211 (2010); Beomsoo Kim, The Impact of
MalpracticeRisk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures,36 J. LEGAL STUD. S79, S79-S119 (2007).
25. David Dranove & Yasutora Watanabe, Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians

Respond to Litigation Against Themselves and Their Colleagues, 12 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 69, 6994 (2010).

26. Y. Tony Yang et al., Does Tort Law Improve the Health of Newborns, or Miscarry?A
Longitudinal Analysis of the Effect of Liability Pressure on Birth Outcomes, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 217, 217-45 (2012).
27. Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth
Outcomes, 123 Q.J. EcoN. 795, 795-830 (2008).
28. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Medical Malpractice Reform and Physicians in
High-Risk Specialties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S121, S133-39 (2007); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of

the Threat of Medical Malpractice Litigation and Other Factors on Birth Outcomes, 33 MED.
CARE 700, 700-14 (1995).
29. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q.J.
ECON. 353, 353-90 (1996); Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, MalpracticeLaw and Health Care

Reform: Optimal Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 175, 189 (2002).
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higher malpractice risk does not improve health outcomes, and lower
risk does not worsen outcomes. However, another study of elderly
heart patients did find that increased malpractice risk is associated
with reduced risk of death for these patients.30
Thus, the empirical evidence does not consistently show that
the medical liability system provides incentives for appropriate care.
The undercompensation of malpractice victims is at least partly to
blame for the weakness of the system's deterrent signal. When doctors
do not expect to bear the full cost of harms caused by their negligence,
they do not have sufficient incentives to take precautions that reduce
the risk of harm. 3 1 In the next Part, I explore how limited access to
legal
representation
exacerbates
both
the
problems
of
undercompensation and underdeterrence inherent in the medical
liability system.
III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM

In order for the malpractice system to provide both
compensation to victims and precautionary incentives for physicians,
victims of medical negligence must be able to find legal
representation. Contingent fee arrangements evolved in the second
half of the nineteenth century to enable tort victims to obtain legal
representation that they could not otherwise afford. Today, lawyers
working on a contingent fee basis bring most medical malpractice
claims. However, victims of medical negligence are finding it
increasingly difficult to locate contingent fee lawyers willing to take
their cases. In this Part, I discuss the historical background of tort
victims' access to legal counsel and the development of contingent fee
arrangements. I then explain the causes and consequences of the
current access-to-justice problem.
A. The HistoricalContext of Access to Justice in Tort Law
Early American tort victims, including victims of medical
malpractice, had limited effective access to legal representation in the
civil justice system. Until the mid-nineteenth century, statutory or
judicial schemes regulated lawyer compensation. These schemes
dictated how plaintiffs were to compensate their attorneys, regardless

30. Praveen Dhankhar et al., Effect of Medical Malpractice on Resource Use and Mortality
of AMI Patients,4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 163, 163-83 (2007).
31. Eisenberg, supra note 18 (manuscript at 10); Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the Medical
MalpracticeSystem and Options for Reform, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 95 (2011).
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of whether they won or lost in court. 32 Thus, although any citizen
could in theory retain legal counsel, few had the financial resources to
risk having to pay the attorney after losing the case. 33 As a result, a
large portion of Americans had effectively no access to the civil justice
system. 34
However, beginning with New York's enactment of the Field
Code in 1848, statutes regulating lawyers' fees were repealed across
the nation. Soon after, the Field Code was revised to allow attorney
compensation to be governed by contract and "not restrained by law." 3 5
The precursors of a contingent fee arrangement first developed
in the mid-1800s when attorneys involved in debt collection matters
agreed to receive as payment a percentage of the amount collected. 36
However, contingent fee contracts did not expand to other areas of the
law until the Industrial Revolution produced victims of industrial
accidents with legitimate claims but insufficient resources to pursue
them. 37 In the states that had not previously authorized contingent fee
arrangements by statute, state supreme courts voiced support for such
arrangements. By the end of the nineteenth century, most states
sanctioned contingent fees, either judicially or legislatively.
The judicial supporters of contingent fees recognized that these
arrangements were necessary to ensure that all tort victims,
regardless of their financial position, had access to legal
representation. For example, in 1840, Justice Samuel Harrington of
Delaware's high court sanctioned a contingent fee arrangement,
proclaiming that "[t]he poor suitor may not have the present means of
payment, and this policy [of voiding contingent fee contracts] may
deprive him of counsel.. .. His rights are nothing unless he can have
the means of enforcing them."38

32. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Princeof
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 35 (1989).

33. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts,a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 243 (1998).
34. Id.
35. N.Y. Code of Remedial Justice, ch. 1, tit. II, art. 2, § 66, 1876 N.Y. Laws (current version
at N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS § 474 (McKinney 2013)); see also Lester Brickman & Lawrence A.

Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary,Statutory and Contract
Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 171-76 (1988) (detailing the evolution of New York attorney
compensation law in the nineteenth century).
36. See MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 1776-1876, at
277 (1976) (describing the development of William Pitt Ballinger's mid-nineteenth-century legal
practice).
37. Brickman, supra note 32, at 37.
38. Bayard v. McLane, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 139, 207, 219-20 (1840).
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Similarly, New Hampshire's Chief Justice Samuel Bell offered
the same rationale for endorsing contingent fees in 1862:
It is not uncommon that attorneys commence actions for poor people, and make
advances of money necessary to the prosecution of the suit upon the credit of the cause.
Thus a man in indigent circumstances is enabled to obtain justice in cases where,
without such aid, he would be unable to enforce a just claim. 39

Missouri's Judge Robert Bakewell agreed in 1876:
Many a poor man with a just claim would find himself unable to prosecute his rights,
could he make no arrangement to pay his advocate out of the proceeds of his suit . .. If
[such agreements] are immoral or illegal, there are perhaps few attorneys in active
practice amongst us who have not been habitual violators of the laws. 40

Thus, most states approved contingent fees because they were
viewed as a financing device that enabled a client to assert and
prosecute an otherwise unaffordable claim.41 Although most countries
in the world still prohibit contingent fees, 42 all fifty U.S. states allow
attorneys to enter into contingent fee contracts. 43
Plaintiffs' attorneys in medical malpractice cases work almost
exclusively on a contingent fee basis. 44 As in other torts cases,
contingent fees enable medical malpractice victims to obtain legal
counsel that they otherwise could not afford. Because of the
substantial cost of litigating medical malpractice cases, the only way
that most victims can afford legal representation is to hire a lawyer on
contingency. Attorneys interviewed in previous studies of contingent
fee practice have explained the necessity of contingent fee
arrangements in medical malpractice cases:
Ninety percent of the people out there make their living, they pay for the kids to go to
school, they pay to take care of their kids, they pay for their mortgage, they pay for their
one or two cars, and at the end of the month, they may have $100 left over if they're the
lucky ones. .. . And so, for someone to have the ability to go hire a lawyer on anything
other than a contingency fee, you know, I think it's a fiction.45

39. Christie v. Sawyer, 44 N.H. 298, 303 (1862) (paraphrasing Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N.H.
347, 355 (1808)).
40. Duke v. Harper, 2 Mo. App. 1, 10-11 (1876).
41. Brickman, supranote 32, at 43.
42. Id. at 39.
43. Michael A. Dover, Contingent Percentage Fees: An Economic Analysis, 51 J. AIR L. &
COM. 531, 535 (1986). Maine was the last state to eliminate barriers to contingent fees. 1965 Me.
Laws 333 (amending ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 801 (repealed 1975)).
44. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between
Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 648 (2006).
45. Id. at 646.
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Another attorney explained, "The simple truth is at least 95 percent of
our clients could not afford to pay the lawyer and could not finance the
lawsuit. They just couldn't-at least 95 percent."46
Contingent fee arrangements developed to improve access to
justice for this 95%. However, although contingent fees have reduced
the disparity in access to legal representation between wealthy and
poor plaintiffs, they have not eliminated the access-to-justice problem
in the medical liability system.
B. Causes of the Current Access-to-Justice Problem
In the modern medical liability system, high litigation costs
and damage-limiting tort reforms have made it economically infeasible
for attorneys to take many medical malpractice cases. As a result,
many legitimate victims of medical malpractice have no way to seek
redress. In this Section, I discuss how high litigation costs and tort
reforms have created silent victims in the medical liability system.
1. Litigation Costs
Medical malpractice suits are very expensive to litigate. The
American Bar Association reports that the cost of prosecuting a single
case of medical malpractice ranges from a low of $50,000 to a high of
$500,000: "Every case require[s] hundreds of hours of work and a huge
outlay of money to pay for the investigation, evaluation by experts,
deposition testimony, travel, etc." 47
Attorneys often assume, as a rule of thumb, that medical
malpractice cases will cost at least $100,000 to litigate: "[Y]ou're
talking about $100,000 that you're gonna spend on technical expertise
to write reports, to give depositions, you know, to explain the standard
of care and how it's been breached." 48 Another attorney echoed that in
medical malpractice litigation, "[e]asily you can spend $100,000

46. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs Lawyers: Dealing with the Possible but Not
Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 347 (2011).

47. James K. Carroll et al., Report on Contingent Fees in Medical Malpractice Litigation,
2004 A.B.A. TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. SEC. 30 (quoting affidavit of Thomas A. Schaffer); see also
Claire Osborn, Many Lawyers Avoiding Malpractice Cases, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 14,
2004, at Al (quoting Bill Whitehurst, a prominent practitioner in Austin, Texas, who states that
"the cost of taking a medical malpractice suit to court can be up to $450,000").
48. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, 'The Juice Simply Isn't Worth the Squeeze in

Those Cases Anymore:' Damage Caps, 'Hidden Victims,' and the Declining Interest in Medical
Malpractice Cases 28 (Am. Bar Found. Research Paper Series 09-01, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1357092 (interviewing several attorneys
regarding the costs of medical malpractice litigation).
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without blinking."4 9 In my own survey of medical malpractice
plaintiffs' attorneys described in the next Part, attorneys responded
that the average cost of taking a medical malpractice claim to trial
was just under $100,000.
Because of the high cost of investigating and litigating medical
malpractice claims, contingent fee attorneys cannot economically
justify taking cases that lack sufficient damages to recoup their
expenses. Under most contingent fee arrangements, the attorney
agrees to pay the litigation costs if he loses the case. If he wins the
case, the plaintiff pays out of his damage award both the litigation
costs and the attorney's contingent fee. The contingent fee is typically
33% to 40% of the award.50 Because attorneys bear the risk of paying
the litigation costs if a case loses, contingent fee arrangements require
attorneys to evaluate cases in terms of the risks and potential returns
of the case.51 As a result, attorneys rationally reject cases that do not
satisfy a sufficient risk-return tradeoff. As one attorney interviewed
for my study noted, "[M]ed-mal litigation is the 'sport of kings' from an
expense standpoint.... [T]he liability/damages mix must present
sufficient strength in both measures to make economic sense."
Another attorney that participated in my survey explained, "The cake
has to be worth the candle. . . . I know if expenses will be high, I won't

take the case without the likelihood of a large recovery."
Consider, for example, a medical malpractice case that is
"cheap" to litigate, costing only $50,000. An attorney with a standard
33% contingent fee rate would likely reject many cases with potential
damages below $150,000. Even with potential damages of $150,000,
the attorney is risking the same amount he stands to earn; he pays
$50,000 in litigation costs if he loses the case, and he earns a $50,000
contingent fee if he wins the case. As a result, the attorney has no
choice but to reject many legitimate victims of medical malpractice
that do not have sufficient damages to offset the litigation expenses.
Access to legal representation becomes even more difficult as
litigation costs increase. A complex case with expected costs of
$500,000 would likely be rejected unless the 33% contingent fee
attorney expected potential damages in excess of $1.5 million.
However, $1.5 million in damages merely allows the attorney to break

49. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times:
The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs'Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1798 (2002).
50. Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System,
81 JUDICATURE 22, 25 tbl.3 (1997).
51. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It's
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1117 (2006).
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even in expectation, so potential damages likely need to be even
higher.
Although not all lawyers charge a 33% contingent fee, and
although some lawyers employ variable fees that depend on their
workload, 52 the basic point does not change-the expense of medical
malpractice litigation eliminates many legitimate victims from the
claims pool. Indeed, research shows that medical malpractice
attorneys accept far fewer cases than they reject. One study of
attorneys' acceptance rates found that attorneys reject 80% or more of
the medical malpractice cases they screen.53 Another report of medical
malpractice attorneys' practice patterns found that 77.1% of attorneys
reject more than 90% of the cases they screen. 54 One of the primary
reasons the attorneys give for rejecting cases was an insufficient
expected return on those cases that are expensive to litigate. 55
2. Tort Reform
As a result of the high costs of medical malpractice
investigation and litigation, many malpractice victims are left without
legal remedy. Damage caps and other tort reforms that artificially
reduce plaintiffs' damages exacerbate these problems. Below, I discuss
the background of the tort reform movement, which reduced medical
malpractice awards to plaintiffs. I then explain how these reforms
reduce contingent fee lawyers' willingness to accept cases.
a. Background of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform
The tort reform movement can be traced back to the 1970s and
1980s, when doctors and insurers sought to avert a perceived crisis in
medical malpractice insurance.56 During this period, the number of
52. Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 739, 759 (2002).
53. Id. at 755 tbl.3.
54. Michael D. Greenberg & Steven Garber, Patterns of Specialization in Medical
Malpractice Among Contingency Fee Attorneys 23 tbl.9 (RAND ICJ Working Paper Series No.
WR-700-ICJ, 2009), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working-papers/
2009/RANDWR700.pdf.
55. LaRae I. Huycke & Mark M. Huycke, Characteristics of Potential Plaintiffs in
MalpracticeLitigation, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 792, 796 (1994).
56. See, e.g., ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INS. & TORT SYs., PRELIMINARY
FACT-FINDING REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 43 (1987); AM. MED. ASS'N SPECIAL TASK
FORCE ON PROF'L LIAB. & INS., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s: REPORT I, at 4-5 (1984)

(detailing the increases in medical malpractice liability during the 1970s and early 1980s); F.
Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians'Point of View ConcerningMedical Malpractice:A Sociological
Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of 'Tort Reform," 23 GA. L. REV. 295, 295-98 (1989) ("The
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medical malpractice claims filed and the size of awards in malpractice
cases grew rapidly.57 Medical malpractice premiums increased
sharply, largely as a result of insurers' rising costs of defending
against medical malpractice claims.5 8
In response to the perceived crisis, physicians and malpracticeinsurance carriers began to lobby heavily for changes that would
reduce medical malpractice tort liability.59 Proponents of such reform
argued that legislation reducing both litigation and plaintiffs' awards
would solve the liability-and-insurance crisis and fix an imbalanced
system. Although several attempts to enact federal legislation failed,
the lobbying efforts persuaded many state legislatures that medical
malpractice reforms were necessary.60 By the mid-1980s, medical
malpractice tort reforms had been widely adopted across the nation.
State-level tort reforms have been aimed at addressing what
critics view as the biggest problems with the medical liability system:
excessive litigation, frivolous cases, and unjustifiably large damage
awards. Although significant variation exists among the chosen
reforms of individual states, most states have elected to reduce
damage awards in some way. Below, I discuss the most common tort
reforms that reduce the damages medical malpractice plaintiffs can
receive.
Perhaps the loudest criticism of the current tort system centers
on the imposition of damages for noneconomic losses. Noneconomic
damages are for nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, loss
of consortium, emotional distress, and other intangible losses. Critics
assert that noneconomic damage awards should be restricted because
the awards serve no compensatory purpose, since money cannot
eliminate pain,61 the awards are arbitrary and unpredictable, 6 2 and
causes of the increased cost and decreased availability of medical malpractice insurance were
believed to be . . . an unjustified increase in tort liability for physicians . . ."); Shirley Qual, A
Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 419-21 (1986)
(describing how the medical malpractice insurance "crisis of availability" in the 1970s resurfaced
as a "crisis of affordability" in the 1980s).
57. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INS. & TORT SYS., supra note 56, at 44.
58. Hubbard, supra note 56, at 297. The increase in premiums was also likely linked to
insurance companies' investment outcomes. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the
Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 394 (2005) (explaining how changed
market conditions and cost projections encouraged increased malpractice insurance premiums).
59. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the 'Tort Reform" Movement, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 469-79 (2006).
60. Id. at 483-84.
61. See, e.g., CANE, supra note 8, at 354 (noting that "when all has been done to minimize
the pain and suffering by medical means, any residual pain and suffering cannot be shifted: it
remains with the victim, no matter what compensation is paid to that person by others"); Abel,
supra note 8, at 802 (arguing that the primary argument for torts damages "is hopelessly
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the awards increase the cost of medical services because doctors and
hospitals pass on their liability costs in the form of higher prices. 63
Thirty states have enacted reforms that cap noneconomic damage
awards in medical malpractice cases. 64 The majority of these caps
limit such awards to between $250,000 and $450,000.
Proponents of tort reform raise many of these same objections
to punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded not to
compensate victims but to punish defendants for reckless or
intentional conduct and to deter future conduct.65 Critics of punitive
damage awards point to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions to
highlight how punitive damages are often excessive in comparison to
compensatory damages, violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 66 Critics also argue that the arbitrary and
unpredictable imposition of the awards has distorted the settlement
process.67 Forty-two states have adopted either caps on punitive
damages or more stringent evidence requirements for awarding them

incoherent-money cannot restore victims to their status quo before the accident" and that
"money is a poor equivalent for non-pecuniary loss").
62. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 777 (1995)
(asserting that there is substantial variability in jury awards for pain and suffering for injuries
of equal severity); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to
Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 324-25 (1989) (analyzing pain-and-suffering awards in 256
wrongful death cases and concluding that there is a lack of horizontal equity in awards).
63. John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for
Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STuD. 371, 371-74 (1992); Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in
Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 392 (1989) ("[A] rational person would insure only
against that pain and suffering that curtailed earnings ....
); George L. Priest, A Theory of the
Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1346-47, 1352 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988).
64. Ronen Avraham, Databaseof State Tort Law Reforms (Tex. Law Econ. Research Paper
No. 184, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902711.
65. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive damages may properly
be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring
its repetition.").
66. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) ("The punitive
award of $145 million, therefore, was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong
committed, and it was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.");
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Punitive
damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they have the potential to
advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating
potential for harm. Regrettably, common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into
the latter category.").
67. See, e.g., Punitive Damage Reform, ATRA, http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damagesreform (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) ("The difficulty of predicting whether punitive damages will be
awarded by a jury in any particular case, and the marked trend toward astronomically large
amounts when they are awarded, have seriously distorted settlement and litigation processes
and have led to wildly inconsistent outcomes in similar cases.").
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in medical malpractice cases.68 The caps typically limit punitive
damage awards to the greater of either a fixed dollar amount (i.e.,
$250,000) or three times the compensatory damage award. The
stronger evidence requirements generally force plaintiffs to establish
that the defendants' conduct was reckless, willful, or intentional by a
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, instead of the preponderanceof-the-evidence standard generally required in civil trials.69
Critics argue that in some states, not only are noneconomic
damages and punitive damages excessive but so too are compensatory
damages. According to this view, overly generous juries ignore facts
and law to award excessive compensatory judgments. 70 The result is
excessive deterrence and an unfair redistribution of wealth to
plaintiffs. In response, ten states have capped total damage awards in
medical malpractice cases. 7 ' In these states, a plaintiffs total
recovery, including both economic and noneconomic damages, is
capped at a fixed amount, often $500,000 or $1,000,000.
Numerous states have also enacted reforms to collateral source
rules that reduce plaintiffs' damage awards. The traditional collateral
source rule prevents the admission of evidence at trial showing that
other sources, such as health insurance, have already compensated a
plaintiffs losses. The rationale for the traditional rule is that a
defendant should not benefit merely because the plaintiff had the
foresight to purchase insurance. Although the rule promotes efficient
deterrence by requiring a tortfeasor to pay damages even when
another source previously paid the victim, critics argue that a
plaintiffs award may exceed the value of the harm he suffered. 72
Reforms to collateral source rules include allowing evidence of
collateral source payments or completely offsetting awards by the
amount of those payments. 73 That is, these reforms allow plaintiffs'
damage awards to be reduced by the amount of reimbursement they
have already received from a collateral source such as health

68. Avraham, supra note 64.
69. Hubbard, supra note 59, at 501.
70. See, e.g., About ATRA, ATRA, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013)
(arguing that large verdicts or settlements in meritless cases are ruining the legal system and
economy).
71. Avraham, supra note 64.
72. See, e.g., Collateral Source Rule Reform, ATRA, http://www.atra.org/issues/collateralsource-rule-reform (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) ("The collateral source rule keeps important
information relevant to the determination of damages from reaching the jury. It allows plaintiffs
to be compensated twice for the same injury.").
73. Avraham, supra note 64.
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insurance or workers' compensation. Thirty-eight states have enacted
such collateral source reforms. 74
Reforms to joint and several liability aim to reduce plaintiffs'
recovery in cases involving multiple defendants. Under the traditional
doctrine of joint and several liability, a plaintiff can recover the full
cost of her injury from any party who is even found partially liable for
the injury. This doctrine allows plaintiffs to collect all of their
damages from a defendant with deep pockets, even if that defendant
contributed only modestly to the plaintiffs injury. The deep pocket
defendant can sue the other tortfeasors for contribution to force them
to pay their share of the damages, but such crossclaims are often
fruitless because the other tortfeasors often lack resources. Although
these rules help to ensure that victims receive full compensation,
critics argue that the rules fail to distribute liability equitably among
defendants. In addition, proponents of reform assert that joint and
several liability precludes optimal deterrence. The deep pocket is
deterred excessively; the large damages may cause her to pay for
excessive precautions or to cease offering the goods or services
completely. The other tortfeasors are deterred inadequately; because
the deep pocket pays for the harm that the others cause, the others do
not pay for the full costs that their conduct imposes.75 Forty-one states
have enacted reforms to joint and several liability in the medical
malpractice context.76 Most reforms to the standard rule of joint and
several liability impose proportionate liability limits for defendants
who contributed only modestly to causing the injury.
Thus, many states have enacted tort reforms that reduce the
damage awards that plaintiffs can recover in medical malpractice
cases. Next, I discuss how these reductions in damages also restrict
plaintiffs' access to legal representation in medical malpractice cases.
b. The Impact of Tort Reform on Patients'Access to Justice
Because the aforementioned tort reforms lower the damage
awards that plaintiffs expect to receive in medical malpractice cases,
contingent fee lawyers are less willing to accept such cases. And
because the cost of trying cases remains the same as before tort reform
but the damages-and, in turn, the contingent lawyer's expected
74. Id.
75. For a general discussion, see Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform, ATRA,
http://www.atra.org/issues/joint-and-several-liability-rule-reform (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) ("In a
state that follows the rule of joint and several liability, . . . the plaintiff may recover 100 percent
of her damages from the solvent defendant that is 5 percent responsible for her injuries.").
76. Avraham, supra note 64.
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recovery-decline, fewer cases will make economic sense for the
lawyer to accept.
Consider, for example, a medical malpractice case with
expected economic damages of $50,000 and expected noneconomic
damages of $500,000. An attorney with a 33% contingent fee rate
would likely reject this case if he expects his litigation costs to be
higher than his expected fee of $181,500 (33% of $550,000). However,
if the state enacts a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages, the
attorney would reject an identical case if the expected litigation costs
exceed $99,000; after the damages cap, the attorneys' expected fee is
only $99,000 (33% of $300,000). Thus, tort reforms that lower
plaintiffs' expected awards reduce access to the civil justice system by
making cases financially unattractive to plaintiffs' lawyers working on
a contingent fee basis.
One medical malpractice attorney interviewed for a study of
the standard practices of plaintiffs' attorneys practices explained that
he could not economically justify accepting many cases after his state
capped noneconomic damages: "Because if it's a case that's gonna
hafta be tried, and the up-end is $200,000 to $250,000, which is a
$100,000 fee, we're not gonna risk $100,000 to get a $100,000 fee. You
can't do that in this business if you expect to be around very long."77
Indeed, attorneys often lament that they have no choice but to
turn down legitimate cases after their states enact tort reform:
In this state there's an epidemic at this time in terms of people who have legitimate
claims going unrepresented. I have looked at cases before [the cap] that had been seen
by four or five other lawyers before they got to me. And I've looked at legitimate
cases .... Now I'm afraid what's happening is they're not really getting looked
at .... [T]hey're [lawyers] making a decision, and I don't know that's an unreasonable
one. I think they're just saying, "We are not gonna do any case that doesn't have the
potential upside to justify the risk that we're gonna take." . . . I would hate to be a
78
plaintiff out there looking for a lawyer right now.

Only two empirical studies have explored the degree to which
tort reform has limited victims' access to the legal system. The first
study directly examined the influence of noneconomic damage caps on
the willingness of plaintiffs' attorneys to accept medical malpractice
clients.79 The researchers conducted surveys of Texas plaintiffs'
attorneys in 2000 and 2006, before and after Texas instituted a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.
For the sixty attorneys who participated in both surveys, the
77.
78.

Daniels & Martin, supranote 48, at 29.
Id. at 33.

79. Steven Garber et al., Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits Reduce
Access to Justice for Victims of Medical Negligence?, 6 J. EMPIRicAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 637 (2009).
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researchers compared their stated willingness to accept cases of three
hypothetical medical malpractice victims. Although the clients had
different levels of economic damages, they all suffered facial
disfigurement-indicating large noneconomic losses that could, absent
a cap, result in a significant award. The empirical results revealed
that the attorneys' willingness to accept all of the clients' cases
declined after the cap was enacted, but it declined significantly more
for the clients with low economic damages.
The second study analyzed the effects of noneconomic damage
caps and attorney-fee limits on attorneys' willingness to accept
medical malpractice cases.80 The researchers surveyed 965 plaintiffs'
attorneys from across the nation, asking how likely each was to accept
a case in three different scenarios. The results confirmed that both
noneconomic damage caps and attorney fee limits substantially
discouraged attorneys from representing clients.81
Hence, the limited empirical work on the subject confirms that
tort reforms and high litigation costs have restricted access to the
legal system for many legitimate victims of medical malpractice.
These factors have made taking cases with damages insufficient to
warrant the litigation expense impossible for many plaintiffs'
attorneys.
C. Consequences of the Access-to-Justice Problem
As litigation costs and tort reforms make accepting many
medical malpractice cases economically infeasible for attorneys,
legitimate victims of medical malpractice are left without legal
representation. In this Section, I discuss various consequences of this
access-to-justice problem. Not only will unrepresented victims likely
receive no compensation for their harms, but victims with low
economic damages will be disproportionately excluded from the legal
system.
Because of the complexity and expense of medical malpractice
lawsuits, employing a lawyer is critical to a successful claim. Indeed,
empirical evidence confirms that an inability to obtain legal
representation effectively eliminates a victim's ability to obtain
redress in the civil justice system. According to one study of medical
malpractice claims, only 0.1% of claims that result in payment are
brought by pro se victims. 82 Another study of closed claims found that
80.
81.
82.

Daniels & Martin, supro note 48, at 27-30.
See id. at 36-37.
Hyman & Silver, supra note 51, at 1094.
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the success rate of pro se and unrepresented plaintiffs was only 5.5%,
whereas the success rate for plaintiffs represented by counsel was
34%.83

Moreover, the economic calculus required by the contingent fee
system causes attorneys to gravitate towards some types of medical
malpractice cases and ignore others. High litigation costs give medical
malpractice attorneys little choice but to ignore smaller cases and
concentrate on cases with larger expected damages, as the lawyers'
fees from a small case will rarely offset the expense of litigating the
case. One medical malpractice attorney explained that a good case is
"anything that has to do with neurological brain damage, something
that's

permanent-[a]

young

person

that

has

a

long . .. life

expectancy; a brain-damaged baby where there's a long life expectancy
that required 24 hour care. . . . [and] where the cost of the damages

are exceedingly high."84 Another echoed, "[T]here's no such thing, as
far as I'm concerned, as a good small medical malpractice case."8 5
Because the majority of adverse events resulting from medical
negligence do not impose serious harm,86 many medical malpractice
victims are unable to find legal representation, and their injuries go
uncompensated. Although compensating victims who suffer serious
harm is typically considered more important, even less serious harms
are often still significant for many victims, and compensation of these
harms is necessary to achieve deterrence. In fact, because many
contingent fee attorneys assume that litigation expenses average
$100,000, they could not economically justify accepting claims that
most people would regard as serious; even a $300,000 damage award
would only allow an attorney with a 33% contingent fee to risk the
same amount he stands to earn if his litigation expenses are $100,000.
As a result, many attorneys develop minimum damages thresholds
below which they will not consider a case. For example, one attorney
interviewed for my survey replied that he would generally not
consider "anything below a $300,000.00 potential recovery."
Although the survey I conducted for this Article is the first to
explore attorneys' minimum damages thresholds in a range of cases,
along with the causes and consequences of those thresholds, one
previous study of specialization among medical malpractice attorneys
asked whether the respondents had a general threshold value for

83. Stephen Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers? Repeat Players and Strategic
Advantage in Medical Malpractice Claims (Am. Bar Found. Working Paper No. 9210, 1992).
84. Daniels & Martin, supra note 48, at 32.
85. Id. at 33.
86. Studdert et al., supra note 16, at 254-55.
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rejecting medical malpractice cases. Over half of the respondents in
that previous survey replied that they would not accept a case if the
expected damages were below $250,000.
Moreover, by limiting certain types of damages relative to other
damages, tort reform disproportionately reduces both compensation
and access to justice for specific segments of the population. For
example, studies show that caps on noneconomic damages
disproportionately reduce compensation to females, children, the
elderly, and the poor, because a much greater proportion of their
damage awards are in the form of noneconomic damages.87 These
demographic groups often have lower incomes than other groups, and,
as a result, they have correspondingly less economic loss and
relatively more noneconomic lon." Thus, noneconomic damage caps
act as a regressive tax by reducing the recoveries of lower-income
plaintiffs by a higher fraction than the recoveries of higher-income
plaintiffs.
The tort reforms that disproportionately reduce the expected
recoveries for lower-income groups also disproportionately reduce the
expected contingent fee that lawyers recover from these clients. Thus,
these reforms disproportionately reduce contingent fee lawyers'
willingness to represent lower-income groups. Empirical evidence
confirms that after tort reforms that restrict noneconomic damages,
attorneys disproportionately refuse to represent females, children, the
elderly, and the poor on a contingent fee basis because of the low
potential recovery.89 Interviews with medical malpractice attorneys
87. NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA 30-33 (2004), available at

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND-MG234.pdf;
Lucinda M.
Finley, The Hidden Victims Of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J.
1263, 1265-66 (2004); Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a
Three-Year Study, 24 IND. L. REV. 1275, 1288-89 (1991).
88. Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue
Collar Workers, and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 749-50 (1996); Christian E. Schlegel,
Note, Is a Federal Cap on Punitive Damages in Our Best Interest?: A Considerationof H.R. 956 in
Light of Tennessee's Experience, 69 TENN. L. REV. 677, 697-98 (2002); Mark Donald, Access

Denied: Does Tort Reform Close Courthouse Doors to Those Who Can Least Afford It?, TEX. LAW.
(Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=900005421359&Access_Denied_
DoesTortReformCloseCourthouseDoors_toThoseWhoCanLeastAffordIt&slreturn=201
30114021026.
89. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical MalpracticeDamage Caps,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 490 (2005) (showing that awards for overall damages have stayed the
same while economic damages have increased, possibly because plaintiffs' lawyers have screened
out women, minorities, and children, who are less likely to receive high economic damages); Troy
L. Cady, Note, Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: The Discriminatory Effects of Punitive
Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 1033 (1997) ("Lawyers will become increasingly
unwilling to represent plaintiffs in lawsuits that have little or no prospect of yielding adequate
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also indicate that certain tort reforms limit access to the legal system
for certain demographic groups. As an attorney interviewed for my
study explained,
"[N]on-wage-earners,
seniors,
nonworking
women ... are the first ones to lose access to the courts when things
like caps on pain and suffering awards are enacted." Similarly, an
attorney interviewed in another study explained, "The biggest problem
is the cap on damages; the $250,000 cap does nothing more than hurt
the children and the housewives and the elderly the most, because
they don't have any economic damages, they don't have any earning
capacity and they don't have any lost wages . . . ."90
In Part IV, I discuss the findings from my own survey of
medical malpractice attorneys. My results confirm that many of the
attorneys quoted in this Section are representative of the general
sentiment among medical malpractice attorneys. Attorneys generally
agree that the costs of litigating medical malpractice cases are high,
that economic realities force them to reject many legitimate cases that
do not have high expected damage awards, and that tort reforms
further restrict the number of legitimate cases that attorneys are able
to accept.
IV. SURVEY
To better understand the problem of silent victims in the
medical liability system, I conducted a survey of attorneys who
currently represent medical malpractice plaintiffs. The survey asked
various questions about the respondents and both their firms (such as
demographic characteristics, firm characteristics, and experience in
medical malpractice work) and their practice patterns (including the
respondents' experiences with medical malpractice case dispositions,
recoveries, and expenses). It also posed questions pertaining to casescreening procedures and access-to-justice issues (such as caserejection rate, reasons for rejecting cases, and minimum damages
among accepted cases). In this Part, I discuss my survey methods and
present data on the survey responses to various questions.

compensation for the large amount of time and money invested .

.. .");

Rachel Zimmerman &

Joseph T. Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers Turn Away Some Cases, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 8, 2004, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/O,,SB109717758841639476,00.html
("[C]aps on damages for pain and suffering ... [are] turning out to have the unpublicized effect of
creating two tiers of malpractice victims.. . . [L]awyers are turning away cases involving victims
that don't represent big economic losses-most notably retired people, children and
housewives....").
90. Daniels & Martin, supra note 44, at 668 (quoting an interview with a personal injury
lawyer in Texas).
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A. Methods
I drew contact information from a list of attorneys published by
Consumer Base and RSA List Services in the spring of 2012.91 These
companies obtain their contact lists from various sources, including
business directories, conference attendance lists, firm websites, and
other sources.
I developed a thirty-five-item online survey addressing various
aspects of attorneys' practices, case-screening procedures, and casedisposition experience. In May 2012, I sent an e-mail with a request to
participate in an online survey to all 23,026 e-mail addresses on my
contact list. The e-mail described the following purpose of the survey:
We are developing a knowledge base of general practice patterns of medical malpractice
attorneys that we can share with all trial attorneys. Although there has been much
speculation about the way that factors such as case characteristics, state laws, and the
nature of an attorney's practice influence litigation and case outcomes, there has been
no systematic study of these influences. This study will explore how these factors
influence attorney decisions to accept or reject cases at screening, and how they relate to
cases that are dismissed, settled, or proceed to trial.

The e-mail also confirmed that the survey responses were
anonymous and provided contact information for follow-up questions
or comments. I received hundreds of comments, several of which are
quoted in Part III of this Article.
The online survey was open for approximately one month. Four
hundred sixty-four attorneys completed the survey during this time.
Ideally, I would be able to estimate a response rate based on the 464
responses. However, to estimate this accurately, I would need to know
the number of medical malpractice attorneys that received my e-mail
request and had the opportunity to take the survey. For various
reasons, this is impossible to know.
First, although my initial contact list contained 23,026 e-mail
addresses, a significant number of the contacts contained incorrect or
out-of-date addresses. Second, not all of the attorneys on the list were
medical malpractice attorneys; many attorneys replied that they had
never litigated medical malpractice cases or had not litigated such
cases in many years. In fact, many had not practiced law in years and
were either retired or working in a different career. Finally, some
e-mail requests were caught in an unknown number of spam folders. 92

91. EXACT DATA CONSUMER BASE, http://www.consumerbase.comlindex.html (last visited
Aug. 23, 2012); RSA LIST SERVs. EXECUTIVE EMAIL LISTS, http://www.rsalistservices.com/ (last
visited Aug. 23, 2012).
92. Although I filled out hundreds of requests from e-mail providers to skip the spam folder,
many attorneys responded that they had found my e-mail in their spam folder.

178

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:151

As a result, the list of 23,026 contacts significantly overestimates the
number of medical malpractice attorneys that actually received the
survey and had an opportunity to respond.
Moreover, to determine the percentage of the total population
of U.S. medical malpractice attorneys that my respondents represent,
I would need to know how many attorneys are actively litigating
medical malpractice cases. However, this number is impossible to
estimate. There is no database that identifies all attorneys in the
United States by the type of work they do. Martindale.com, the largest
online index of attorneys, which includes contact information for over
one million practicing attorneys, is likely the source closest to a
comprehensive list of American attorneys. 93 Martindale.com reports
that there are 10,894 attorneys across the United States that selfidentify as practicing in the area of medical malpractice. Only 3,493 of
these attorneys are active members of the American Bar Association.
Even these numbers may overestimate the true number of medical
malpractice lawyers. And because attorneys self-report their practice
area, the Martindale.com index reports the type of work that
attorneys would be willing to do, not the type of work in which they
have experience. As a result, many of the 10,894 attorneys that
checked the "medical malpractice" box may have little or no experience
litigating medical malpractice cases.
As with any voluntary survey, there is a potential for selection
bias, even if the underlying pool of attorneys to whom I sent the
survey is unbiased. Because my e-mail describing the survey
suggested that the purpose of the research is to understand medical
malpractice attorneys' practice patterns and how various factors affect
these patterns, attorneys that are more concerned with the state of
their current practice may be more likely to respond. As a result, the
responses may disproportionately reflect the concerns and practices of
only this group of attorneys. Nevertheless, as I show in the next
Section, the responses to the basic demographic questions all indicate
that my sample of respondents is very representative of the larger
population of medical malpractice attorneys. Moreover, the survey
responses are consistent with other research findings, suggesting that
selection bias may not be a serious problem.

93.

MARTINDALE.COM, http://www.martindale.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
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B. Basic Demographic Characteristicsof Respondent Plaintiffs'
Attorneys
The survey elicited information regarding a series of
demographic characteristics about the respondents and their
practices. The first question asked whether the respondents had
primarily represented medical malpractice plaintiffs or defendants in
the past year. Of the 464 respondents, 259 reported that they had
primarily represented medical malpractice plaintiffs; the other 205
respondents reported that they had primarily engaged in medical
malpractice defense. The respondents' answer to this first question
directed them to either a set of questions relevant to plaintiffs'
attorneys or a set of questions relevant to defense attorneys. As this
Article is concerned with the access-to-justice issue among medical
malpractice plaintiffs, the remainder of my discussion of the survey
results will only pertain to the responses of the 259 plaintiffs'
attorneys. Future work on other topics will discuss the survey
questions and responses for the defendants' attorneys.
The survey's demographic questions were designed to
determine whether respondents were representative of the larger
population of U.S. medical malpractice attorneys. Attorneys from at
least thirty-nine states answered the online survey,94 suggesting a
great deal of geographic diversity among the survey respondents.98
The first two questions were designed to determine whether
the respondent's firm characteristics are representative of the larger
population of medical malpractice attorneys. Answers to the question,
"Which of the following best describes the location of the office in
which you work?" revealed that the great majority of the survey
respondents practice in urban areas. Table 1 reports the distribution
of attorney respondents among different office locations. This
distribution of locations is consistent with other studies finding that
medical malpractice plaintiffs' attorneys overwhelmingly practice in
urban areas.96

94. A number of respondents chose not to provide their state.
95. The number of respondents practicing in each state were: No Answer: 94; Alabama: 4;
Arizona: 14; Arkansas: 1; California: 6; Colorado: 2; Connecticut: 4; Florida: 18; Georgia: 11;
Hawaii: 1; Illinois: 7; Indiana: 3; Kansas: 4; Kentucky: 3; Louisiana: 1; Maine: 1; Maryland: 10;
Massachusetts: 2; Minnesota: 2; Mississippi: 2; Missouri: 2; Nebraska: 1; Nevada: 1; New
Hampshire: 1; New Jersey: 3; New Mexico: 1; New York: 7; North Carolina: 3; Ohio: 14;
Oklahoma: 2; Pennsylvania: 13; Rhode Island: 1; Tennessee: 3; Texas: 5; Utah: 2; Virginia: 4;
Washington: 3; Washington, D.C.: 1; Wisconsin: 1; Wyoming: 1.
96. Greenberg & Garber, supra note 54, at 13 (finding that 64.7% and 28.9% of respondents
worked in urban and rural settings, respectively).
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Table 1: Office Location of Respondents
Office Location
Rural

Percentage of
Respondents
4.27%

Suburban

24.39%

Urban

71.34%

To the second question-"Approximately how many attorneys
work in your law office?"-the majority of respondents reported that
they worked in offices with fewer than five attorneys. Table 2 shows
the distribution of the survey respondents among different firm sizes.
This distribution is consistent with other reports on medical
malpractice attorneys, which find that the average firm specializing in
medical malpractice has only two attorneys.97
Table 2: Firm Size of Respondents
Firm Size

Percent of
Respondents

Solo practice

12.80%

2 to 5 attorneys

43.29%

6 to 10 attorneys

25.00%

11 to 50 attorneys

16.46%

More than 50 attorneys

2.44%

I designed the next set of survey questions to determine
whether the litigation experience of my respondents is representative
of the larger population of medical malpractice attorneys in the United
States. Answers to the question, "How many years have you been
litigating medical malpractice cases?" revealed a substantial amount
of experience among my respondents. As reported in Table 3, the
majority of the respondents had over twenty years of experience. This
level of experience is consistent with other reports that have found an
average of twenty-four years of practice experience among medical
malpractice attorneys.98

97. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Texas Plaintiffs'Practice in the Age of Tort Reform:
Survival of the Fittest - It's Even More True Now, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 305-06 (2006).
98. Greenberg & Garber, supra note 54, at 11.
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Table 3: Experience Litigating Medical Malpractice Cases
Years
Fewer than 10 years

Percent of
Respondents
4.85%

10 to 19 years

23.64%

20 to 29 years

35.15%

More than 30 years

36.36%

The survey also asked the respondents, "Approximately how
many medical malpractice cases are you working on now?" As shown
in Table 4, most of the respondents were handling fewer than fifteen
such cases at the time of the survey. In general, the respondents that
were involved in more cases tended to practice in larger firms.
Table 4: Number of Current Medical Malpractice Cases
Number of
Current Cases

Percent of
Respondents

Fewer than 5 cases

31.90%

5 to 15 cases

41.10%

16 to 50 cases

22.09%

More than 50 cases

4.91%

Finally, to understand the amount of specialization in medical
malpractice cases among the respondents, the survey asked, "Which of
the following best describes how much time you spend working on
medical malpractice cases?" Table 5 shows that substantial diversity
exists in the degree of specialization among the survey respondents.
The majority of the survey respondents devoted either less than 25%
of their time or more than 75% of their time to medical malpractice
cases. Again, this distribution of specialization is consistent with other
reports on the practice patterns of medical malpractice attorneys.99

99. Id. at 12 (finding that 41.6% of respondents spent less than 25% of their time on
medical malpractice cases and that 79.94% of respondents spent more than 75% of their time on

medical malpractice cases).
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Table 5: Specialization on Medical Malpractice Cases
Percentage of Time

Percent of
Respondents

Less than 25% of my time

32.72%

Between 25% and 50% of my time

19.14%

Between 51% and 75% of my time

14.81%

More than 75% of my time

33.33%

Thus, the survey respondents practice in at least thirty-nine
states and work in firms that are representative of the larger
population of U.S. medical malpractice attorneys. Moreover, the
respondents' practice experience and specialization in medical
malpractice work is similar to that found in other reports of the
practice patterns of medical malpractice attorneys.
C. Case-DispositionExperience
To better understand the practice patterns of medical
malpractice attorneys, the survey asked a series of questions about
the attorneys' recent experience in case dispositions. Responses to the
question, "Approximately how many [medical malpractice] cases did
you close last year?" revealed that the average respondent closed
fourteen cases last year. Table 6 reports the distribution of closed
cases among the survey respondents.
Table 6: Medical Malpractice Cases Closed Last Year
Cases Closed

Percent of
Respondents

Fewer than 5 cases

37.36%

5 to 10 cases

33.33%

11 to 50 cases

25.86%

More than 50 cases

3.45%

To explore how these cases were closed, the survey asked,
"Approximately what percentage of the cases that you closed last year
were: dismissed without payment, settled with payment prior to trial
proceedings, settled with payment during trial, and went to jury
verdict?" Table 7 reports that the majority of cases were settled.100 The
percentage of cases that went to trial (9%) is consistent with data from
100. The percentages in Table 7 do not add up to 100%, but they exclude certain casedisposition outcomes such as bench trials.
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the largest independent medical-professional-liability research
database, which reports that 8.5% of medical malpractice claims went
to trial in 2010, the most recent year for which data was available.101
Table 7: Case Dispositions Among Survey Respondents
Percent of Medical Malpractice Cases
Dismissed without payment
Settled with payment prior to trial proceedings
Settled with payment during trial
Went to jury verdict

Average Percent
Among Respondents
11%
54%
2%
7%

To explore plaintiffs' success at trial, the survey asked
questions pertaining to plaintiff win rates and plaintiff recovery.
Responses to the question, "What percentage of your cases that went
to a jury verdict last year were in the plaintiffs favor?" indicate that
the average plaintiff win rate by jury was 27%. This plaintiff win rate
is low compared to plaintiff win rates in general civil trials, which a
recent study been found to be 56%.102 However, the survey's low
percentage of plaintiff wins is consistent with other data on medical
malpractice trial outcomes, which find that plaintiffs win in 23% of
medical malpractice trials.103
To further explore plaintiff outcomes, the survey also asked the
question, "What would you estimate was the average amount awarded
to the plaintiff in your cases that settled for payment last year and
resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiff?" The respondents reported
an average settlement award of $652,060 and an average damage
award from jury verdict of $1,519,727. Table 8 reports the distribution
of respondents indicating average award amounts for settlements and
jury verdicts. Not surprisingly, awards from jury verdicts tend to be
much higher than settlement amounts. In fact, the majority of jury
awards reported were over $1 million. Although the proportion of jury
awards over $1 million among my responses is slightly higher than a
recent report on civil trial awards, the concentration of jury awards
over $500,000 is consistent with recent research.104
101. PHYSICIAN INSURERS AsS'N OF AM., CLAIM TREND ANALYSIS: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL LIABILITY DATA REPORTED TO THE PIAA DATA SHARING PROJECT, Exhibit
6c (2011).
102. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL BENCH
AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 4 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov

/content/pub/pdf/cbitsc05.pdf.
103. Id. (reporting that plaintiffs win in 23% of medical malpractice trials).
104. Id. at 5.
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Table 8: Average Plaintiff Awards in Settlements and
Jury Verdicts

Average Award Amount
Less than $50,000

Percent of Respondents
Indicating Average
Award in Settlements

Percent of Respondents
Indicating Average
Award from Jury
Verdict

3.38%

0.00%

$50,000 to $150,000

12.16%

12.73%

$150,000 to $500,000

48.65%

27.27%

$500,000 to $999,999

14.86%

9.09%

$1 million or greater

20.95%

50.91%

To explore attorneys' recovery and costs in medical malpractice
cases, the survey asked questions relating to contingent fees and
litigation expenses. The survey asked the question, "What is your
average fee as a percentage of the award in cases that settle with
payment made to the plaintiff and result in a jury award to the
client?" Among the respondents, the average contingent fee in cases
that ended in a settlement was 35%, and the average contingent fee in
cases that ended in a jury award to the plaintiff was 36%. Table 9
reports the distribution of average contingent fees among cases ending
in settlement and jury awards.
Table 9: Average Contingent Fee in Settlements and Jury
Verdicts
Average
Contingent Fee
Less than 20%

Percent of
Respondents
Indicating Average
Fee in Settlements
6.38%

Percent of Respondents
Indicating Average Fee
from Jury Verdict
4.85%

20% to 29%

12.06%

7.77%

30% to 40%

73.05%

80.58%

8.51%

6.80%

Greater than 40%

Finally, to understand the attorneys' litigation expenses, the
survey asked, "What would you estimate are the average litigation
costs of your medical malpractice cases that: were dismissed without
payment, settled with payment made to the plaintiff, and resulted in a
jury verdict for the plaintiff?" Table 10 reports the averages of the
respondents' answers. Not surprisingly, the litigation costs are highest
when cases go to trial. Moreover, the $97,369.79 average litigation
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cost among cases ending with a jury verdict for the plaintiff is very
similar to the expected $100,000 cost that many attorneys use as a
rule of thumb when screening cases.
Table 10: Average Litigation Expenses Among Different Cases
Case Disposition

Average Litigation
Costs

Dismissed without payment

$18,062.76

Settled with payment made to the plaintiff

$58,275.89

Resulted in jury verdict for plaintiff

$97,369.79

D. Case Screening and Access to Justice

The final set of survey questions relate to the attorneys'
experiences screening cases and the problem of victims' access to
justice. The responses reveal that the majority of screened cases, even
strong cases, are rejected if the expected damage award is not large
enough to offset litigation costs. Thus, the survey confirms that access
to justice is a significant problem in today's medical liability system.
To understand attorney screening procedures, the survey asked
questions about the number of cases screened and the percent of those
cases rejected. Responses to the question, "Within the last year,
approximately how many medical malpractice suits did you screen?"
indicate that the majority of respondents screened fewer than fifty
cases. Table 11 reports the number of cases screened among the
survey respondents.
Table 11: Medical Malpractice Cases Screened in Last Year
Cases Screened in
Last Year

Percent of
Respondents

Fewer than 10 cases

12.17%

10 to 50 cases

42.61%

51 to 100 cases

20.00%

101 to 500 cases

20.00%

More than 500 cases

5.22%

Next, the survey asked, "Approximately what percentage of the
cases that you screened did you reject?" The responses, shown in Table
12, indicate that the majority of attorneys reject between 95% and
99% of the cases they screen. In fact, 76.8% of the attorney
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respondents indicate that they reject more than 90% of the cases they
screen. This percentage is remarkably consistent with results from
another report of medical malpractice attorneys' practice patterns,
which found that 77.1% of attorneys accept fewer than 10% of the
cases they screen. 105
Table 12: Percent of Screened Cases That Are Rejected
Percent of Screened Cases
that Are Rejected
Less than 75%

Percent of
Respondents
5.21%

75% to 89%

18.01%

90% to 94%

25.59%

95% to 99%

42.18%

More than 99%

9.00%

To understand the reasons why attorneys reject so many cases,
the survey asked, "Which of the following was your primary reason for
rejecting the cases that you did last year?" As reported in Table 13,
the most common reason for rejecting cases was insufficient damages.
Moreover, over half of the respondents indicated that cost factorseither insufficient damages or the expense of bringing the claim-were
the primary reasons for rejecting cases.
Table 13: Primary Reasons for Rejecting Case
Reason for Rejecting Case
Unclear causation
Unclear evidence of malpractice
Case is unlikely to settle
Insufficient damages expected from trial or settlement
Complexity and expense of bringing the claim
Hospital not involved in malpractice

Percent of
Respondents
19.25%
29.11%
0.94%
38.73%
11.74%
0.23%

To further explore the degree to which the expected damages
affect attorneys' likelihood of accepting cases, the survey asked, "Do
you have a minimum threshold for the potential damages award,
below which you will not accept a case?" If the attorneys answered in
the affirmative, they were asked the amount of the damages
threshold. This question was asked with different percentage
likelihoods of succeeding on the legal merits-95%, 51%, and 25%.
105. Greenberg & Garber, supranote 54, at 14.
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Table 14 reports the damage threshold chosen for each likelihood of
winning. As expected, the minimum damages threshold below which
attorneys will not accept a case increases as the likelihood of winning
the case decreases; as case risk increases, so does the required return.
This risk-return tradeoff is economically rational and is seen in all
areas of investment behavior.
Table 14: Damage Thresholds for Accepting Cases
Damages
Threshold To
Accept Case
Less than
$50,000

Percent of
Respondents with
95% Success on
the Merits

Percent of
Respondents with
51% Success on
the Merits106

Percent of
Respondents with
25% Success on
the Merits 107

1.18%

0.78%

0%

$50,000 to
$149,000

20.71%

3.10%

4.17%

$150,000 to
$249,000

22.49%

7.75%

4.17%

$250,000 to
$499,000

27.81%

17.83%

8.33%

$500,000 and
over

27.81%

70.54%

83.33%

$250,000

$500,000

$1,000,000

Median
Damages
Threshold

The results confirm that access to justice is a significant
problem in today's medical liability system. First, virtually no
attorney will accept any medical malpractice case if the expected
damages are less than $50,000, even if the likelihood of winning is
95%. As the majority of medical malpractice victims do not suffer
harm that equates to an exorbitant damage award,108 this result
indicates that many victims will not be able to obtain legal
representation.
Second, well over half of the attorneys indicated that they
would not accept a case, regardless of the likelihood of winning, if the
expected damages are less than $250,000. This is consistent with a

106. Thirteen percent of respondents indicated that regardless of the expected damages, they
would never accept a case with this likelihood of winning on the merits.

107. Nineteen percent of respondents indicated that regardless of the expected damages,
they would never accept a case with this likelihood of winning on the merits.
108. PHYsIcuN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM., supra note 101, at Exhibit 8.
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RAND survey (Patterns of Specialization in Medical Malpractice
Among Contingency Fee Attorneys) that has examined whether
attorneys have a damage threshold below which they will not accept a
case. 109 Although the RAND survey did not allow respondents to enter
their own damage-threshold categories and did not differentiate
between different likelihoods of winning, it similarly found that 53% of
attorneys would automatically reject a case if the expected damages
were less than $250,000.
Finally, the median thresholds in the survey responses indicate
the damages below which at least half of medical malpractice
attorneys will not even consider taking a case. The reported medians
reveal that most attorneys will not accept a slam dunk case (95%
likelihood of winning) unless the expected damages are over $250,000.
Most attorneys, moreover, will not accept a case that is more likely
than not to be decided in the plaintiffs favor (51% likelihood of
winning) unless the expected damages are over $500,000. And finally,
most attorneys will not accept a case that is tough to win on the
merits (25% likelihood of winning) unless expected damages are at
least $1 million.
Lastly, to determine whether tort reform has exacerbated the
medical liability system's access-to-justice problem, the survey asked,
"Which of the following reforms have reduced your willingness to
accept cases?" Table 15 reports the percentage of respondents who
selected each choice. Over 80% of the respondents indicated that some
tort reform had reduced their willingness to accept cases. As predicted
by the theoretical literature and the two previous studies of tort
reform's impact on case acceptances,110 the reform that was most
commonly named as affecting attorneys' willingness to accept cases
was noneconomic damage caps.
Table 15: Tort Reforms' Impact on Willingness to Accept Cases
Tort Reform
Noneconomic damage caps
Punitive damage caps
Reforms eliminating joint and several liability
Reforms to the collateral source rule
None
Other

Percent of
Respondents
31.25%
3.87%
12.50%
15.77%
19.35%
17.26%

109. Greenberg & Garber, supra note 54, at 14.
110. Daniels & Martin, supra note 48, at 32-33; Garber et al., supra note 79, at 638.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE PROBLEM

In this Part, I further explore the implications of this access-tojustice problem. First, using data on median plaintiff recoveries in
medical malpractice actions from 1985 to 2010, I show that only the
most severely injured victims will be able to easily find legal
representation. Then, I present data that reveal a worsening accessto-justice problem. These data show that plaintiffs with expected
damage awards lower than $250,000 are finding it increasingly
difficult to obtain legal representation. Without legal representation,
fewer and fewer of these plaintiffs are recovering any payment for
their harms.
The data I employ are from the Physician Insurers Association
of America ("PIAA"), the insurance-industry trade association
representing domestic and international companies providing medicalprofessional liability insurance."1 PIAA maintains the world's largest
independent research database on medical-professional liability. It
collects data from its members, which provide insurance protection to
more than 60% of America's private practice physicians and write
approximately 46%, or $5.2 billion, of the total industry premium. The
PIAA medical malpractice data provide information on more than
274,000 medical and dental claims and lawsuits. As the PIAA data
cover such a large proportion of the litigation in the U.S. medical
liability system, it is frequently used to develop national overviews of
claims and litigation.
A. Identifying the Silent Victims
Drawing from the PIAA data, Table 16 reports the median
payment made to plaintiffs between 1985 and 2010 by severity of
plaintiff injury and primary allegation against the medical provider.112
For example, the table reports that for allegations of improper
performance-when either an operative or diagnostic procedure is
done incorrectly-the median payment to plaintiffs suffering only
111. See generally PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM, supra note 101.
112. Id. at Exhibit 8. The severity of the patient injuries is defined as follows: emotional
injury only: "fright, no physical damage"; insignificant injury: "lacerations, contusions, minor
scars, and rash. No delay in recovery"; minor temporary injury: "infections, misset fractures, fall
in hospital, Recovery delayed"; major temporary injury: "burns, surgical material left, drug side
effects, brain damage. Recovery delayed"; minor permanent injury: 'loss of fingers, loss or
damage to organs. Includes non-disabling injuries"; significantpermanent injury: "deafness, loss
of limb, loss of eye, loss of one kidney or lung"; major permanent injury: "paraplegia, blindness,
loss of two limbs, brain damage"; grave: "quadraplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care or
fatal prognosis." COHEN & HUGHES, supra note 19, at 6.
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emotional injury was $20,000. In contrast, the median payment to
settle similar allegations made by plaintiffs suffering grave injuriesinjuries requiring lifelong care-was $457,341. The payment data are
from a significant number of claims; for example, the data on median
payments made for improper performance claims is collected from
65,603 closed claims.
Table 16: Median Payment Made to Plaintiffs Between 1985
and 2010 by Severity of Plaintiff Injury and Primary
Allegation Against the Medical Provider

Severity of Patient's Injury

Median
Indemnity
for Improper
Performance

Median
Indemnity
for Errors in
Diagnosis

Median
Indemnity for
Failure to
Supervise or
Monitor

Median
Indemnity
for
Medication
Error

Emotional injury only

$20,000

$16,625

$36,625

$20,000

Insignificant injury

$17,500

$16,278

$12,500

$10,000

Minor temporary injury

$30,000

$25,000

$25,000

$12,500

Major temporary injury

$75,000

$60,000

$70,000

$25,000

Minor permanent injury

$85,000

$100,000

$100,000

$60,311

Significant permanent injury

$152,659

$142,341

$175,000

$115,000

Major permanent injury

$300,000

$225,000

$250,000

$220,079

Grave

$457,341

$200,000

$464,031

$292,500

Death

$150,000

$150,000

$110,000

$100,000

Total Number of Closed
Claims from 1985 to 2010

65,603

52,159

18,115

10,473

The data on median payments are for actual claims and thus
situations when victims of medical malpractice were able to obtain
legal representation. These claims likely had higher expected damage
awards, therefore, than the majority of cases that the attorneys were
unwilling to take. Nevertheless, the data reveal that recoveries for
less serious injuries are often small enough that if the attorneys
expected the final recovery to equal the median recovery, 113 they
113. The definition of "median" implies that half of the cases in each category result in
payments less than or equal to that median recovery.
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would often refuse to take the case. Although the specific decision to
take a case will depend on both the expected recovery and the
expected costs-so that attorneys will take low recovery cases if they
expect litigation costs to be low as well-many of the median
payments in Table 16 are lower than the median minimum damage
thresholds indicated in my survey results.
For example, Table 14 reported that even for a case that had a
95% likelihood of winning on the merits, over 98% of attorneys would
refuse to take the case if expected damages were below $50,000. Table
17 shows that if these attorneys expected the final recovery in such a
case to be equal to the median recovery reported in the PIAA data,
they would refuse to take all of the cases represented by the shaded
regions. Thus, attorneys would never accept a case with median
expected recovery-even with slam dunk odds-if the only injuries
were emotional, insignificant, or minor and temporary, regardless of
the allegations against the doctor.
Table 17: Attorney Rejection of Cases if Minimum Damages
Threshold Is $50,000

Severity of Patient's Injury

Median
Indemnity
for Improper
Performance

Median
Indemnity
for Errors in
Diagnosis

Median
Indemnity for
Failure to
Supervise or
Monitor a
Case

Emotional injury only

$201000

$16,6

$86,625

$20,000

Insignificant injury

$17,500

$16,218

$12,500

$10,000

$2 5,

$25,000

$12,500

Minor temporary injury

L

Median
Indemnity
for
Medication
Error

Major temporary injury

$75,000

$60,000

$70,000

$25,000

Minor permanent injury

$85,000

$100,000

$100,000

$60,311

Significant permanent injury

$152,659

$142,341

$175,000

$115,000

Major permanent injury

$300,000

$225,000

$250,000

$220,079

Grave

$457,341

$200,000

$464,031

$292,500

Death

$150,000

$150,000

$110,000

$100,000

Moreover, the PIAA data indicate that the injuries depicted in
the shaded region of Table 17 make up over 24% of claims for medical
negligence. This implies that 98% of attorneys would refuse to accept

I
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almost a quarter of medical malpractice victims' claims unless the
expected damages were significantly greater than the typical damages
for those injuries.
The situation becomes even more dire when considering the
cases that will be rejected by 50% of attorneys, even given a 95%
likelihood of success. As reported in Table 14, most attorneys would
not accept a slam dunk case (95% likelihood of winning) unless the
expected damages are over $250,000. As a result, Table 18 shows that
for at least half of the attorneys in my survey, 114 if the final recovery
in a case is expected to equal the median recovery, they would refuse
to take any case falling within the shaded regions. Thus, even for
cases that they are almost certain to win, at least half of the attorneys
would never accept a case that resulted in any injury not grave or
major and permanent unless they expected damages that were
considerably above the median. At least half of the attorneys would
refuse to accept a case that resulted in death if they only expected a
median recovery.
Table 18: Attorney Rejection of Cases if Minimum Damages
Threshold Is $250,000

Severity of Patient's Injury

Median
Indemnity
for Improper
Performance

Median
Indemnity
for Errors in
Diagnosis

Median
Indemnity for
Failure to
Supervise or
Monitor

Median
Indemnity
for
Medication
Error

Emotional injury only

$20,000

$16,625

$36,625

$20,000

Insignificant injury

$17,500

$16,278

$12,500

$10,000

Minor temporary injury

$30,000

$25,000

$25,000

$12,500

Major temporary injury

$75,000

$60,000

$70,000

$25,000

Minor permanent injury

$85,000

$100,000

$100,000

$60,311

Significant permanent injury

$152,659

$142,341

$175,000

$115,000

Major permanent injury

$300,000

$225,000

$250,000

$220,079

Grave

$457,341

$200,000

$464,031

$292,500

Death

$150,000

$150,000

$110,000

$100,000

114. At least half of the attorneys indicated that their minimum damages threshold for a
case with a 95% likelihood of success was $250,000.
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Moreover, the PIAA data indicates that the shaded region in
Table 18 represents over 95% of injury claims. Thus, 95% of medical
malpractice victims will find it extremely difficult to find legal
representation unless their damages are substantially more than the
typical damages for their types of injuries.
The data on median payments indicate that unless attorneys
expect a recovery that is far greater than the median, they will not
accept cases for anything but the most serious injuries. This finding is
consistent with attorneys' claims that "there's no such thing . .. as a

good small medical malpractice case." 15

B. The Worsening Access-to-Justice Problem
Next, I analyze data on closed claims resulting in payments of
different dollar amounts from 1985 to 2010. The data suggest that the
problem of access to justice is worsening.
Figure 1 reports PIAA data on the dollar values of payments to
medical malpractice plaintiffs from 1985 to 2010, in 2010 dollars. The
data reveal that, although the number of payments above $250,000
has remained relatively constant over this period, the number of
payments below $250,000 has dropped dramatically. In fact, there
were fewer than half the number of payments below $250,000 in 2010
as there were at the peak in the late 1980s.
Figure 1: Trends in Dollar Value of Paid Medical Malpractice
Claims from 1985 to 2010 (2010 Dollars)
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These data confirm that plaintiffs with expected damage
awards lower than $250,000 are finding it increasingly difficult to
obtain legal representation. Indeed, other explanations for the
dramatic drop in payments under $250,000 seem improbable. For
example, it is unlikely that the number of medical errors causing
small injuries with harm under $250,000 decreased over two decades
while the number of medical errors causing larger harms remained
constant. Similarly, it is improbable that plaintiffs' attorneys have
become less successful at winning small cases while remaining
consistently successful at winning large cases. Instead, the time-trend
data suggest that without legal representation, fewer and fewer
victims with small harms are receiving compensation for their harms.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article presents survey results that confirm that there are
many silent victims in the American medical liability system. High
litigation costs make accepting many legitimate cases economically
infeasible for contingent fee attorneys. Unless expected damages are
large, the attorneys simply cannot justify accepting many cases
because the expected fees will not offset the high costs of medical
malpractice litigation. Moreover, the economic calculus required by
the contingent fee system causes attorneys to gravitate toward some
types of medical malpractice cases and victims while ignoring others.
Evidence shows that contingent fee attorneys disproportionately reject
cases from lower-income groups such as females, the elderly, children,
and racial minorities because their expected damage awards are often
relatively low.
Victims who cannot attain legal representation are effectively
excluded from the civil justice system. Because of the complexity and
expense of medical malpractice lawsuits, employing a lawyer is critical
to a successful claim. Thus, without legal representation, most of these
victims will not be compensated for the harm they suffer as a result of
medical negligence. In turn, the medical liability system will fail to
provide adequate precautionary incentives for healthcare providers.
Without dramatic change, then, victims' limited access to
justice will continue to hinder the medical liability system's ability to
achieve its compensatory and deterrent functions. Unfortunately,
most legislative reforms over the past several decades have only
exacerbated the access-to-justice problem. Damage caps and other tort
reforms that artificially reduce plaintiffs' damage awards also reduce
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contingent fee attorneys' expected recoveries. As a result, even fewer
cases make economic sense for the attorneys to accept.
In order to increase victims' access to the medical liability
system, future reforms should aim to either increase attorneys'
willingness to accept cases or provide compensation to victims without
an attorney. For example, reforms that increase legal-services funding
would ensure that attorneys are minimally compensated for their
time. Similarly, reforms imposing attorneys' fees awards on negligent
defendants would encourage some attorneys to accept cases even if the
expected damages and, in turn, the expected contingent fees, are
low.n 6
Alternatively, reforms could create a system under which
legitimate victims receive compensation even if they do not have legal
representation. For example, several scholars have proposed an
administrative compensation system under which claims for medical
injuries are handled through an administrative body rather than the
judicial system.117 Proposals for such a model indicate that the process
would be simple enough that claimants would not need legal
representation, as their claims would be resolved by neutral
adjudicators and neutral medical experts. America's experience with
such a system is limited to the federal Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, which covers certain vaccine-related injuries, and Florida
and Virginia's administrative systems, which cover certain birthrelated neurological injuries. However, broader administrative
systems have successfully operated in other countries-Sweden,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and New Zealand-for decades. Although
replacing America's current medical liability system with an
administrative system would be a dramatic change, only a significant
overhaul of the current system will resolve the access-to-justice crisis.

116. The Brennan Center has proposed similar reforms to increase access to justice for lowincome citizens. Closing the Justice Gap, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter
.org/content/section/category/civiljustice/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
117. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., Administrative Compensation for Medical Injuries:
Lessons from Three Foreign Systems, 14 ISSUES INT'L HEALTH POL'Y 1, 2 (2011) (explaining that
in the administrative reform model, medical injury claims are referred through an
administrative body or "health court," rather than other courts, which allows claimants to avoid
obtaining legal counsel).

